Efficiency and Environmental Factors in the US Electricity Transmission Industry by Llorca, M. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency and Environmental Factors in the US 
Electricity Transmission Industry 
 
 
Manuel Llorca, Luis Orea, and Michael Pollitt 
 
May 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 1318 & EPRG 1310 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
Efficiency and Environmental Factors in the 
US Electricity Transmission Industry 
EPRG Working Paper      1310 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics      1318 
Manuel Llorca, Luis Orea, and Michael Pollitt 
 
 
Abstract : The electricity industry in most developed countries has been restructured over 
recent decades with the aim of improving both service quality and firms’ performance. 
Regulated segments (e.g. transmission) still provide the infrastructure for the competitive 
segments and represent a notable amount of the total price paid by final customers. However 
there is a lack of empirical studies that analyze firms’ performance in the electricity 
transmission sector. We conduct an empirical analysis of the US electricity transmission 
companies for the period 2001-2009. We use stochastic frontier models that allow us to 
identify determinants of firms’ inefficiency and to control for weather conditions, potentially 
one of the most decisive uncontrollable factors in electricity transportation. Our results 
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1. Introduction 
The electricity industry in most developed countries has been restructured over 
recent decades with the aim of reducing costs, improving service quality and 
encouraging electricity utilities to perform efficiently. As a result, former state-owned 
utilities were privatized and electricity sectors were vertically separated into generation, 
transmission, distribution and commercialization, particularly in the Europe (see Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2005). Whereas some of these segments such as generation and 
commercialization were opened to competition, other segments such as transmission 
and distribution are still regulated. In this sense, incentive-based regulation schemes 
have been recently implemented in several countries (e.g. UK, Norway) in order to 
encourage both transmission and distribution utilities to perform efficiently. 
Joskow (2011) points out that for industries in which regulated segments provide 
the infrastructure platform upon which competitive segments rely, social welfare 
depends on firms’ performance and reforms made in both regulated and competitive 
segments. Much of the research in the electricity industry has focused on competitive 
wholesale markets, although the regulated segments provide the infrastructure for the 
competitive segments and even though networks constitute a significant share of the 
final price paid by electricity consumers.1 Even though electricity transmission is 
necessary for distribution and commercialization, there is a lack of empirical studies 
that analyze both the economic characteristics of the technology and firms’ inefficiency 
in the electricity transmission.  
Statistical benchmarking methods have been largely used in the electricity 
industry to determine the relative efficiency of individual firms’ costs compared to their 
peers (see Brophy Haney and Pollitt, 2009, 2012). Obtaining reliable (and fair) 
measures of firms’ inefficiency requires controlling for the different environmental 
conditions under which each firm operates. This is especially acute in benchmarking 
because of the financial implications that this analysis can have over the firms and their 
effect over the whole network. 
One of the most decisive uncontrollable factors in electricity transportation (i.e. 
in transmission and distribution) is the weather conditions of the area in which the 
companies operate. Billinton and Wenyuan (1991), and Billinton and Acharya (2005) 
tried to explain changes in the probability of failure rate in the system using complex 
mathematical models. Generally speaking, they pointed out that most technical 
interruptions occur when weather is adverse and, in particular, extremely adverse. They 
also showed that assessing likely failure rates while ignoring weather tend to give too 
optimistic and erroneous predictions.  
Regarding electricity transmission, Billinton and Wu (2001) pointed out that 
overhead transmission lines are exposed to a wide range of weather conditions and, that 
both failures rates and the probability of overlapping failures tend to increase sharply 
during periods of extremely adverse weather conditions. Rothstein and Halbig (2010) 
find that many atmospheric and hydrological parameters not only affect electricity 
generation and consumption, but also electricity transportation. Indeed, overhead lines 
are affected by atmospheric influences in several ways, such as failures by lightning, 
wind, additional weight (e.g. ice or snow), low temperatures, humidity and moisture. 
                                                 
1 Typically distribution and transmission charges combined compose around 25% of the pre-tax and 
environmental charges residential bill. 
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Despite the potential role of weather conditions in electricity transportation, only 
a few recently published papers have analyzed firms’ performance in the electricity 
distribution sector controlling for environmental factors. These include Nillesen and 
Pollitt (2010), Yu et al. (2009), Jamasb et al. (2010, 2012) and Growitsch et al. (2012).  
On the other hand, as far as we are aware there are only four published papers that 
separately study the performance of transmission firms, and none of them have 
controlled for weather characteristics and inefficiency determinants. Using a sample of 
US firms, Pollitt (1995) analyzed differences in efficiency between state-owned and 
private electricity transmission companies. He did not find significant differences 
between both types of firms using parametric and non-parametric specifications of the 
frontier model. Using US data, Huettner and Landon (1978) and Dismukes et al. (1998) 
have examined the existence of returns to scale in the provision of electric transmission 
services. Huettner and Landon (1978) do not find increasing returns to scale, except for 
one category of sales expenses. In contrast, Dismukes et al. (1998) find significant 
economies of scale for all the NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation) 
reliability regions using data for the period 1986-1991. Recently, von Geymueller 
(2009) carried out a comparison of static and dynamic DEA models in electricity 
transmission using data of 50 US utilities for the period 2000-2006. The author finds 
that static models tend to overestimate firms’ inefficiency because they do not take into 
account the existence of quasi fixed inputs. 
Our paper contributes to the literature analyzing firms’ performance in the 
electricity transmission industry with an empirical analysis of the US electricity 
transmission system for the period 2001-2009. The analysis of economic characteristics 
of the technology (such as economies of scale or economies of density) and the 
inefficiency of each US utility relies on the estimation of several specifications of the 
heteroscedastic frontier model proposed by Caudill et al. (1995). In this model, the 
variance of the inefficiency term depends on a wide range of variables such as weather 
variables, a measure of companies’ cost structure and growth rates of energy demand. 
Hence, unlike previous papers, our stochastic frontier models allow us to identify the 
determinants of firms’ inefficiency in this industry.2 An additional contribution of the 
present paper is that we control for weather characteristics by including a set of weather 
variables as determinants of firms’ inefficiency that were gathered specifically for the 
present application. In addition, as our sample period is more recent than those analyzed 
in previous papers we can see whether there has been an improvement in average 
efficiency in the US electricity transmission industry. 
 The estimated coefficients provide useful information about the firms’ 
performance with both policy and managerial implications. We find using more recent 
data and larger firms than in previous papers that, given network infrastructure, 
electricity transmission networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics. Our results 
also indicate that more adverse conditions generate higher levels of inefficiency. 
However, we find that investing in capital is a better strategy than incurring additional 
operating costs to deal with adverse weather conditions. On the other hand, we find that, 
as expected, firms' performance gets better when demand tends to be steady as firms 
cannot adjust their inputs without cost over time. The average efficiency at the 
beginning of the period is larger than in previous studies. But, regardless of the 
estimated model, our results indicate that efficiency has declined (and diverged) over 
                                                 
2 Our model also allows us to discuss whether the environmental factors should be treated as determinants 
of firms’ performance or as technological cost drivers. 
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time, suggesting that there is room for improvement in the performance of the US 
electricity transmission system. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
transmission and distribution literature and the most commonly used approaches to 
implement in incentive regulation schemes. Section 3 describes the theoretical cost 
function that we estimate as well as the empirical specification of the model. Section 4 
presents the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 reports the 
parameter estimates and the results obtained from those estimates. Section 6 presents 
the main conclusions. 
 
2. Benchmarking in electricity transmission 
The electricity sector is an industry with different and interrelated activities, 
which are affected by production and consumption decisions across the whole system. 
The US electricity system traditionally has been composed of large vertically integrated 
utilities. Nevertheless, in the last two decades several reforms have been implemented 
with the aim of disaggregating most utilities into differentiated segments. These reforms 
have led to different treatments of the separated activities: generation and supply (retail) 
are regarded as potentially competitive markets, while transmission and distribution 
networks are treated as natural monopolies that have to be regulated (see Joskow, 2011). 
As Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) point out, from an economic perspective, the aim of 
electricity unbundling is to provide utilities with incentives to improve their operating 
and investment efficiency and to ensure that consumers benefit from the gains. The 
main methods used to achieve these objectives are the incentive regulation mechanisms, 
which include financial rewards and penalties for the firms linked with their 
performance. 
Joskow (2011) notes that much of the research in this sector has focused on the 
competitive markets although the regulated segments provide the infrastructure for the 
competitive segments and represent an important amount of the total price paid by final 
consumers and they have an important joint effect with competitive segments on social 
welfare. For these reasons, electricity transmission has played an important role in the 
success of liberalised power markets. Electricity reforms have led to the creation of 
some bodies to perform the coordination functions that formerly were internal to the 
firms. To deal with this issue and the stresses in transmission system after years of 
underinvestment, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) pursued the 
implementation of a Standard Market Design and encouraged the so-called Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTO) to facilitate efficient trade over wide areas and 
transmission investment. According to Greenfield and Kwoka (2011), the RTOs – such 
as PJM - provide transmission services but do not own transmission facilities and they 
are not responsible for the maintenance and repair, or fixed investment costs, of the 
transmission facilities over which they direct the flow of power. Their essential role is 
as independent service provider that administers the terms and conditions of 
transmission services and maintains the short-term reliability of the network. 
Despite the importance of RTOs in the overall performance of the electricity 
system, the transmission utilities and the structure of the network charges have a great 
effect on network use and its development. Following Brunekreeft et al. (2005, p.74-
75), the setting of the charges at an appropriate level is a key issue because it affects 
“the locational choices of new generation (and of energy intensive users), as well as 
influencing the bidding behavior of generators, and the willingness of neighboring 
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electricity markets to trade and cooperate”. As a result, “ideally the structure of network 
charges should encourage: i) the efficient short-run use of the network (dispatch order 
and congestion management); ii) efficient investment in expanding the network; iii) 
efficient signals to guide investment decisions by generation and load (where and at 
what scale to locate and with what choice of technology-base-load, peaking, etc.); iv) 
fairness and political feasibility, and v) cost-recovery” (Brunekreeft et al., 2005, p.75). 
There are different regulatory practices across the world to set the total amount 
of network charges in the electricity market which are mostly based on benchmarking, 
i.e. on measuring firm’s efficiency against the firms with best practice performance (see 
Brophy Haney and Pollitt, 2012). As regulators reward or punish firms according to 
their (in)efficiency level, the reliability of these scores is particularly crucial for 
regulatory credibility. Any efficiency estimate tries to measure the gap between actual 
cost (production) and the optimal point on the cost (production) frontier, which must be 
estimated from the available data. Published papers have basically employed two 
approaches to estimate cost (production) frontiers. The first approach includes 
parametric techniques that require specifying a particular functional form for the cost or 
production frontier, such as the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) or Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). The second approach is the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) which requires fewer assumptions about the shape of the efficiency frontier. 
Both parametric and nonparametric techniques have their pros and cons, and the 
selection of an appropriate estimation method is contentious and may influence the 
obtained results and the consequent regulatory policy implications (see, for instance, 
Coelli et al., 2005). 
Despite the relevance of transmission networks in the electric power industry is 
very difficult to implement a statistical benchmarking for most of the countries due to 
the lack of domestic comparators (Brophy Haney and Pollitt, 2012). International 
benchmarking can be an alternative to deal with this issue, but the regulators face 
several problems. Joskow (2011, p.54-55) notes that the layout of the transmission 
network depends on countless factors, such as “the distribution of generators and load, 
population density, geographic topography, the attributes and age of the legacy 
networks’ components and various environmental constraints affecting sitting of new 
lines, transformers and substations”. Moreover, there is no standardization or 
homogeneity among countries about the voltage boundaries between transmission and 
distribution networks. For instance, in the UK the transmission network is formed by 
elements that run at 275 kV and above, while in other countries like the U.S. or France 
transmission network is formed by elements that run above 60 kV, making an 
international comparison a challenging task. Regarding the inputs and outputs that 
should be taken into account in an empirical analysis on efficiency of transmission 
systems, Pollitt (1995) pointed out that it might be desirable to take every specific factor 
of the company into account due to the complexity of the network. Each transmission 
system is unique because of the different kinds of inputs that they use and the 
environment in which they operate. 
By constrast, statistical benchmarking methods have been largely used in 
electricity distribution to determine the relative efficiency of individual firms’ operating 
costs and service quality compared to their peers.3 Some countries such Germany, 
Nordic countries and Switzerland have a large number of utilities. This provides a 
                                                 
3 Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) show the most used approaches and provide a survey of benchmarking studies 
applied mainly in OECD countries. 
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suitable basis for the use of advanced benchmarking techniques and without necessarily 
having recourse to international benchmarking. It is generally desirable for regulators to 
have a large number of utilities for comparison and efficiency benchmarking.  
As mentioned above, obtaining reliable (and fair) measures of firms’ 
inefficiency requires controlling for the different environmental conditions under which 
each utility operates. This is especially acute in benchmarking because of the financial 
implications that this analysis can have over the firms and their effect over the whole 
network. For this reason, recent studies in electricity distribution have tried to control 
for the effect on firms’ performance of several environmental factors, such as weather 
conditions, across the electricity distribution system. For instance, Korhonen and 
Syrjänen (2003) develop an approach to evaluate the cost-efficiency of Finnish 
electricity distribution companies based on DEA paying attention to environmental 
variables under which the companies operate. Yu et al. (2009) have also highlighted the 
importance of considering external factors when evaluating the effectiveness of 
regulatory policies in the UK electricity distribution industry. These authors show using 
nine weather variables that severe weather conditions tend to increase service 
interruptions, and this in turn increases costs associated with replacing the damage 
equipment and restoring power.  
Jamasb et al. (2010 and 2012) also find that weather matters in the UK 
distribution network and conclude that weather variables should be included as cost 
drivers.4 Using weather and geographic composites, Growitsch et al. (2012) do not find 
a large influence of environmental variables on the distribution companies’ efficiency 
and the average efficiency rankings. However, the effect on the cost is remarkable. 
Their simulations predict up to 30% lower costs than average, for utilities that operate in 
areas with extremely good environmental conditions, and up to 39% higher costs than 
average, for utilities that operate in areas with extremely bad environmental conditions. 
On average, they predict higher costs of about 5% as a result of hostile weather 
conditions. 
Finally, Nillesen and Pollitt (2010) have also applied a benchmarking analysis 
including environmental conditions to study the performance of electricity distribution 
companies in the U.S. and correcting those variables for estimating the potential 
efficiency gains. They do not find that companies with unfavorable conditions are worse 
performers. 
 
3. Theoretical model and empirical specification 
In this section we introduce the theoretical cost model that allows us to analyze 
the economic characteristics of the technology, such as economies of scale or 
economies of density, of US electricity transm n firms. In general terms, the cost 
function to be estimated can be t n
issio
 wri te  as: 
       ln ܥ ൌ ln ܥሺݕ, ݊, ݌, ݐሻ     (1) 
where C is a measure of total costs, y is a vector of outputs, n measures the network 
length, p is a vector of input prices, and t represents the time trend. As usual, if firms 
                                                 
4 Their results also suggest that the lack of inclusion of variables related to weather conditions might 
downward bias the estimated coefficients of other relevant variables, and, in particular, those associated 
to marginal cost of quality improvements. 
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minimize cost, this function should be linearly homogeneous with respect input prices, 
and increasing in outputs. 
Our cost variable is total expenditure (i.e. operating plus capital costs) due to the 
presence of possible trade-offs between operating and capital expenditures (Giannakis et 
al. 2005). The literature on electricity networks also suggests a positive relationship 
between cost and network length, thus the system size variable used in our application. 
Besides the network length, Ofgem (2011, p.44-46) recognizes the peak demand, the 
energy delivered and the age of assets as the fundamental cost drivers in electricity 
transmission. All of these variables are included in our cost function except age of 
assets as its effect on total cost is not clear as older assets imply higher operating costs 
but lower capital outlays.5  
Economies of scale and density of electricity transmission firms can be 
computed once equation (1) is estimated. We associate economies of scale with 
horizontal system expansion, that is, increases in demand that require enlarging the 
current network to meet extra demand.6 These economies can be then measured by the 
sum of cost elasticities with respec h t  and the network length, n:  t to t e ou puts, y,
ܧܵ ൌ ப ୪୬ ஼
డ ୪୬ ௬
൅ ப ୪୬ ஼
డ ୪୬ ௡
     (2) 
While a value of ES less than one indicates the existence of economies of scale, 
a value higher than one indicates the existence of decreasing returns to scale. Looking at 
the results obtained for US electricity transmission by Huettner and Landon (1978), 
Pollitt (1995) and Dismukes et al. (1998) we expect to find economies of scale in our 
empirical application. 
On the other hand, we associate economies of density with vertical system 
expansion, i.e. expansion in transmitted electricity that do not require additional 
network. These economies can be measured by the sum of elasticity of cost with respect 
to the outputs, y. 
ܧܦ ൌ ப୪୬ ஼
డ ୪୬ ௬
     (3) 
In this case, the cost elasticity of network is not taken into account, as we are 
considering an increase in output levels, given the actual length of the transmission 
network. 
Measuring gaps between actual costs and efficient (i.e. minimum) costs requires 
estimating a cost frontier from the available data. The stochastic frontier literature 
suggests that deviations with respect to the cost frontier cannot be entirely attributed to 
inefficiency and hence we must control for other sources of deviations (i.e. random 
noise) to achieve this objective. To capture other sources of deviations, Aigner et al. 
(1977) proposed using an econometric specification of the cost function (1) that 
includes two random terms, measuring respectively random noise and inefficiency. This 
model can be presented as follows: 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ௜ܺ௧Ԣߚ ൅ ݒ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧    (4) 
where i stands for firms and t for time, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, α and β 
are parameters to be estimated, vit~N(0,σv2) is the classical symmetric random noise, 
                                                 
5 We included age of assets in our first estimates but this variable was not statistically significant. 
6 Note that here density is held constant because both output levels and network size is expanded 
simultaneously. 
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and uit is a one-side error term which captures inefficiency. Following Aigner et al. 
(1977), we assume that this term follows a half-normal distribution, i.e. uit ~N+(0,σu2). 
We also assume that vit and uit are not correlated with each other or with the explanatory 
variables. 
An important caveat of this basic model is that it does not allow the examination 
of the determinants of firms’ performance, which is the main issue examined in this 
paper, as the inefficiency term in (4) has constant variance. It might also yield biased 
estimates of both frontier coefficients and firm-specific inefficiency scores (see Caudill 
and Ford, 1993).7  
 There are some models in the stochastic frontier literature that permit 
incorporating efficiency determinants.8 Among the set of proposed heteroscedastic 
models in the literature, we propose estimating a model that satisfies the so-called 
scaling property,9 which implies that our inefficiency term can be written as a 
deterministic function times a one-sided random variable that does not depend on any 
efficiency determinant. In this case, u  as: it can be written 
ݑ௜௧ ൌ ݄ሺ݉௜௧, ߛሻ ൉ ݑ௜௧
כ      (5) 
where h(·) is a scaling function that always takes positive values, mit is a vector of 
efficiency determinants, γ is a vector of  parameters to be estimated, and uit* is a random 
term that follows a half-normal distribution with constant variance, σu2. As equation (5) 
implies that our inefficiency term uit is distributed as N+(0,σ2it), where σit = h(mit,γ), the 
defining feature of models with the scaling property is that firms differ in their mean 
efficiencies, but not in the shape of the distribution of inefficiency. That is, the scaling 
property implies that changes in mit affect the scale but not the shape of uit.  
 In this model uit* can be viewed as a measure of “raw” inefficiency that does not 
depend on any observable determinant of firms’ inefficiency. On the other hand, the 
scaling function h(·) can be interpreted as the portion of total estimated inefficiency that 
researchers are able to explain with the variables included in h(·). This function hence 
“adjust” the underlying, and unexplained, inefficiency level upwards or downwards due 
to the influence of some potential inefficiency determinants.  
 Although it is an empirical question whether or not the scaling property should 
hold, it has some features that we find attractive (see Wang and Schmidt, 2002). For 
instance, we prefer the above multiplicative decomposition of uit instead the alternative 
additive decomposition of the form uit(mit,γ) = h(mit,γ) + τit introduced by Huang and 
Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli (1995) because the additive decomposition can never 
actually be a decomposition into independent parts as uit(mit,γ) ≥ 0 requires τit ≤ h(mit,γ). 
In our model, we can decompose uit into explained and unexplained inefficiency simply 
dividing the estimated inefficiency by the estimated value of h(·). Moreover, the 
interpretation of γ does not depend on the distribution of inefficiency, and simple 
scaling functions yield simple expressions for the effect of mit on mean efficiency. In 
                                                 
7 Although the stochastic specification in (4) is able to control for random noise, the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity among observations might bias the efficiency measures. Different empirical 
strategies have been developed in the literature to deal with this problem (see Greene, 2005a, b, and more 
recently Wang and Ho, 2010). However, these strategies do not easily deal with rarely changing variables, 
i.e. variables with little within or temporal variation such as network length or energy delivered. For a 
discussion on this issue, see Greene et al. (2011).   
8 For a review of this literature see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
9 See Álvarez et al. (2006) for a review of the models that incorporate this property in the literature on 
frontier production functions. 
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this sense, if we follow Caudill et al. (1995) and use an exponential scaling function so 
that h(mit,γ) = exp(mit′γ), then the γ are just the derivatives of ln(uit) with respect to mit, 
and have standard interpretations as marginal effects. In addition, if h(mit,γ) only 
includes a time trend as a determinant of inefficiency (i.e. mit=t), our model is similar to 
Battese and Coelli (1992) but using a pooled specification for the inefficiency term. 
Inserting (5) into (4) and assuming an exponential scaling function, the model to 
be finally estimated b can e written as: 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ௜ܺ௧Ԣߚ ൅ ݒ௜௧ ൅ ݁ݔ݌ሺ݉௜௧Ԣߛሻ ൉ ݑ௜௧
כ     (6) 
 
4. Data and sample 
We use a panel data set of 59 U.S. electricity transmission companies for the 
period 2001-2009. Most of these data were collected by various members of the EPRG 
at the University of Cambridge. That information was requested by the British 
regulator, Ofgem, in order to carry out an international benchmarking of electricity and 
gas utilities. When the transmission operations are part of a larger utility - also involved 
in generation or distribution - shared costs are allocated on pro-rata basis. As can be 
seen in the data appendix, an allocation key based on the ratio between wages and 
salaries specific from transmission and the total labour expenses of the utility, were 
used for the assignment of shared costs to transmission. The main source of the 
electricity transmission data was the FERC form 1, an annual report of major electric 
utilities, and the variables collected included the: quantity of assets, voltage levels by 
asset, maximum demand, load density, demand growth, maturity of service area, 
age/condition of network, network density and flow patterns.10 
Although the choice of input and output variables is an important issue, there is 
no clear consensus about the variables that should be included to describe the 
performance of transmission and distribution companies. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) 
show the wide range of variables that have been used in benchmarking analysis of 
electric utilities. They find that the most common used inputs in studies of electric 
utilities are operating costs, number of employees, transformer capacity, and network 
length. Regarding the outputs, the most included variables are units of energy delivered, 
number of customers, and the size of service area. 
As we have mentioned in Section 3, our cost variable is Totex. This variable is 
the sum of Opex, which includes operation and maintenance expenses incurred by the 
                                                 
10 The original dataset was collected by the members of the EPRG and it includes information of 
electricity and gas utilities in the US from 1994 to 2009 and also contains information on non-US firms 
from other countries for a shorter period. Following Ofgem’s (2011, p. 20) report, non-US transmission 
firms were not included in the analysis due to data limitations. Despite of the initial proposal on 
international benchmarking in that report, so far, these data have not been used. In our paper the sample 
was reduced to the last 9 years because labour costs in the electric power transmission industry are only 
available from 2001 to 2009. We have removed observations with missing and implausible values. We 
have also dropped a few number of isolated observations and maintained firms with (at least three) 
consecutive observations in order to minimize changes in our estimates when we change the specification 
of our model. It should be noted that this procedure does not give us a balanced panel, as we do not have 
the same number of observations per firm. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel data set of 405 
observations without discontinuities across time. 
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company over one year, and Capex, which is the sum of annual depreciation on capital 
assets and the annual return on the balance of capital.11 
Following the basic economic theory of production and the literature on 
electricity networks, we use as explanatory variables of total cost: two types of outputs, 
a variable that measures the system size, labour and capital price, an investment variable 
and a time trend. Our output variables are Peak Load (PL) and Electricity Delivered 
(DE). While the first one is the maximum peak load of the year during 60 minutes and it 
might reflect transmission investment requirements given a fixed transmission capacity, 
the second one is the total annual energy delivered by the system which may imply an 
incremental effect in operating cost due to a greater use of electricity transmission 
assets. In Figure 1 we show the evolution over time of the output variables divided by 
Totex, which can be interpreted as partial and observable productivity (efficiency) 
measures.12 We can see in this figure a clear negative trend of the peak loads given the 
total expenditure of each firm. In the case of electricity delivered, the temporal pattern 
of this variable is not so clear. These graphs give us a first idea about the negative 
evolution of the efficiency in our sample as the output level per dollar of cost, 
decreases, or in other words, the total unit cost per output, increases over time. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Network length (NL) is usually viewed as one of the most important cost drivers 
of an electricity network (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). To measure the network length we 
have used pole miles. This variable measures the total sum of all transmission lines in 
miles regardless of the number of power cables on each power line so it is essentially 
a measure of the geographic spread of each company. We thought about using 
circuit miles instead pole miles, but the problem of circuit miles is that this variable 
refers to the number of power cables on each line multiplied by the distance between 
two points, but it does not take into account the capacity of the cable so it is an 
unreliable measure of the physical infrastructure. 
The electricity industry is highly intensive in capital with much of the assets 
becoming quasi-fixed (or sunk cost) upon investment (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). This 
implies that adapting quasi-fixed inputs to the needs of the network is not costless and, 
hence, they cannot be instantaneously adjusted as it has been implicitly assumed in 
equation (2). To avoid this assumption, and following Morrison (1985), we include a 
measure of investment in our cost function. In particular, the Investment 
Proxy (INV) measures the total transmission plant ‘additions’ of the companies at the 
end of the year once the value of the land and the land rights have been deducted. We 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable as it allows us to control for adjustment 
costs incurred by putting new capital into place.  
Regarding input prices, we include in the cost function a Labour Price variable 
(LPR) defined as the average annual wage for the electric power transmission and 
distribution industry by state.13 Regarding the Capital Price variable (KPR), we have 
finally used a producer price index for power transmission, available at state level, as a 
                                                 
11 RTO costs are included in the total costs. For more information about the calculation of Totex and the 
rest of variables, see the appendix. 
12 As we have an unbalanced panel of 59 firms, to depict this figure we have selected those firms that are 
observed during the whole sample period, i.e. 29 firms. This avoids comparing different sets of firms in 
different periods. 
13 Unfortunately this information is not available at firm-level. 
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proxy for capital price.14 The source of these two variables is the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
We use 9 variables that are expected to affect firms’ performance and, hence, 
they are included as determinants of the efficiency term. In particular, we include the 
following variables: another time trend, three weather variables (minimum temperature, 
wind and precipitation),15 the ratio Capex/Opex and two variables which measure the 
growth of the demand. We gradually introduce these variables in the model in order to 
examine the robustness of our parameter estimates.16 
Our weather variables have been obtained from the surface daily weather 
information collected by the National Climatic Data Center for the 2001–2009 period. 
The files available for the around 3,000 weather stations located in the U.S. contain 
information about: mean, maximum and minimum temperatures, precipitation amount, 
wind speed, number of days with snow, hail, tornadoes, etc. Given the high correlation 
among several weather variables, we decided to include one variable for each one of 
these categories: Temperature (TMIN), Precipitation (PRCP) and Wind (WIND). The 
temperature variable is the annual minimum temperature in Fahrenheit degrees, wind 
speed is the average of the daily mean wind speeds in knots, and precipitation is the 
average of the daily precipitation in inches. These weather variables are measured at 
state-level, not at firm-level. In order to obtain a unique value of each variable per state 
and year, we have taken the average among the weather stations within a particular state 
except for the case of the temperature variable which is the minimum daily value 
measured by any of the above stations along the year. Then, each utility was associated 
with the weather of the state where its principal office is located17. We hereafter assume 
that more adverse conditions appear when wind speed and precipitation are high and 
minimum temperature is small. 
As utilities may adapt their operating and investment practices over time to 
prevent power interruptions and to reduce the effect of adverse weather conditions, we 
interact our weather variables with the mean of the ratio of Capex and Opex (COR) for 
each firm i over the Ti available observations for this firm. We expect a negative 
coefficient if investing in Capex is a better strategy rather than incurring additional 
operational and maintenance costs in dealing with adverse weather conditions.  
Finally we have included two variables that measure the average Growth in 
Demand for each firm over time. We distinguish between positive growth (POSGR) and 
negative growth (NEGR). The coefficients of these two variables should not be 
statistically significant if there are not adjustment cost and all inputs can be adjusted 
(without cost) from one year to the next. However, as the electricity industry is highly 
intensive in capital with much of the assets becoming sunk cost upon investment, we 
                                                 
14 We have estimated our models using several indices and variables calculated with financial information 
of the companies. Their coefficients were not statistically significant or they even had unreasonable 
magnitudes from an economic point of view.  
15 We firstly introduced the weather variables in our cost function as determinants of the technology, i.e. 
of the frontier cost function. These variables become not significant once our weather variables were 
introduced simultaneously as inefficiency determinants. For this reason we include weather only in the 
stochastic part of our model as a determinant of the efficiency term. 
16 We have also tried to include other variables related with the regulation of the sector, like regional 
dummies for the NERC regions, the level of vertical integration and the percentage of own generated 
energy that flows through the transmission utility, but we either found convergence problems when 
maximizing the likelihood function or that the estimated coefficients were not statistically significant. 
17 We recognise that this is a limitation especially when transmission companies may cover more than one 
state. 
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expect significant coefficients for POSGR and NEGR. In particular, we expect a 
positive effect of POSGR on inefficiency indicating that utilities tend to anticipate 
future increases in the demand by investing in capital that is expected to be efficiently 
used in the future, but not in the present.18 We expect a negative coefficient NEGR if 
there is a negative trend in demand and reducing quasi-fixed input levels is expensive 
due to the existence of adjustment costs. 
The descriptive statistics of all monetary, physical variables and environmental 
used in the stochastic cost frontiers are shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5. Empirical results 
We estimate a Translog cost function. This function can be interpreted as 
second-order approximation to the companies’ underlying cost function. All the 
variables are included in the model in logarithms, except the time trend. Each 
explanatory variable is measured in deviations with respect to its mean, so the first-
order coefficients can be interpreted as the cost elasticities evaluated at the sample 
mean. As usual, homogeneity of degree one in prices as imposed by normalizing cost 
and labour price with capital price. Thus, the estimated equation can be written as 
follows: 
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where for notational ease, the vector y stands for outputs and network length, i.e. y=(PL, 
DE and NL). We show in Table 2 the estimated parameters using two alternative 
specifications for the stochastic part of the model: the basic stochastic frontier model 
introduced by ALS which is labeled as model M1, and several heteroscedastic 
stochastic frontier models that include inefficiency determinants. We propose 
introducing gradually four sets of inefficiency determinants in order to see the 
robustness of our parameter estimates. These models are labeled from M2 to M5. 
 [Insert Table 2] 
In general, all models perform quite well as most of the first-order coefficients 
have the expected sign and their magnitudes are quite reasonable from a theoretical 
point of view. Certainly, the coefficients of the two outputs are always positive and 
statistically different from zero when measuring the incremental costs associated to 
either higher maintenance and operational costs or the need of new capital. A similar 
statement can be made about the coefficients of input prices, which are also positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the time trend is negative, which indicates 
that costs decrease over time, i.e. there is technical change. However, this technical 
change is non-neutral as the coefficient on the time trend is negative when interacts with 
electricity delivered and network length, but it is positive when accompanies the peak 
                                                 
18 As Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) note, achieving long-term efficiency improvements can involve short-
term increases in Capex or Opex that may not generate immediate efficiency improvements. In fact, 
increases in short-term expenditure can deteriorate the firms’ short-term relative performance. This might 
in turn discourage firms from efficiency-improving investments that have long-term gains. 
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load. The coefficient of the investment variable is positive and statistically significant 
which suggests, as abovementioned, the existence of adjustment costs associated to 
changes in quasi-fixed inputs when new capital is added. The estimated coefficients for 
these variables maintain the signs and similar values as we introduce the blocks of 
variables in the variance of the inefficiency term. 
In model M2 we also introduce a time trend but as a determinant of the 
inefficiency. The coefficient of the time trend in this case is positive, indicating that 
efficiency levels decrease over time. In M3 we introduce three weather variables. Our 
results indicate that weather is an important issue in this industry. Moreover, the 
negative sign for the minimum temperature shows us that lower minimum temperature 
increases cost due to higher levels of inefficiency. Average wind speed and average 
precipitation have a positive coefficient indicating again that more adverse conditions 
generate higher levels of inefficiency. In model M4 we include the average ratio of 
Capex and Opex (COR) interacting with the weather variables to catch an idea about the 
best strategy to deal with adverse weather conditions. The estimated coefficients have 
the opposite sign to those obtained for the isolated weather variables, indicating that, as 
expected, that more capital-intensive utilities (e.g. with higher capital-to-opex ratios) are 
able to mitigate better the effect of unfavourable weather conditions, and hence tend to 
be, ceteris paribus, more efficient than those utilities using a higher proportion of 
operating inputs. This result suggests therefore that investing in equipment is a better 
strategy than incurring additional operating costs in mitigating the effects of 
unfavourable weather conditions.  
The next set of variables incorporated in model M5 are two firm-specific rates of 
growth of the demand. We get the expected sign of the coefficients for POSGR and 
NEGR, indicating as we supposed that utilities are more efficient in stable 
environmental conditions or, more specifically, when the demand is unchanging. 
As the most comprehensive model M5 nests the previous ones, we employ a 
likelihood ratio test to analyze whether simpler models are as good as model M5. As it 
can be viewed in Table 2, the performed tests allow us to reject models M1 to M4 in 
favour of the Model M5. We then use this model to examine in detail both the estimated 
levels of cost efficiency and the characteristics of the estimated technology. 
In Figure 2 we depict the histogram of estimated levels of cost efficiency. The 
average efficiency in our sample is 85.2% using our preferred model.19 Pollitt (1995) 
using 1990 data found an average efficiency of 80% for the total of the companies in his 
sample and 88.3% for larger firms. The latter value exceeds the one that we have found 
with our preferred model. This seems to indicate that the performance of the electricity 
transmission utilities has not experienced a significant improvement from one period to 
the next. As we have mentioned in Section 3, the estimated inefficiency in our model 
can be decomposed into two independent components, one explained and the other 
unexplained. The latter component can be simply obtained dividing the estimated 
efficiency scores by the values of the scaling function and we obtain the “raw” scores of 
inefficiency. The average raw efficiency obtained after the correction is virtually equal 
to the one obtained from the estimates. This implies that the inefficiency determinants in 
                                                 
19 Using the ALS model, the average efficiency is 77.3%. This is lower than the mean value of efficiency 
obtained with our preferred heteroscedastic model. Regarding the ranking of firms the correlation 
coefficient between the rakings obtained with M1 and M5 is also too low as it takes the value of 0.54. 
These differences might be taken as an anecdotal evidence of the biases that might appear in an empirical 
application when inefficiency determinants are not taken into account. 
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model M5 allow us to explain the raw inefficiency but not to reduce the inefficiency 
estimated. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
We show in Figure 3 the temporal evolution of our efficiency scores. The graph 
shows that the average level decreases over time, starting at 91.7% and finishing at 
77.3%. It should be noted that this worsening of firms’ performance is also obtained 
using more restricted model, such as Model 2 that only includes a time trend as an 
efficiency determinant and its coefficient is positive indicating that average inefficiency 
rises over time. All estimated models suggest increasing divergence in performance 
over time. Overall, the estimated evolution in performance and the lack of convergence 
in firms’ inefficiency scores seem to suggest that there is scope for improvements in the 
performance of the US electricity transmission system. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Next, we use our preferred Model 5 to examine some characteristics of the 
estimated technology. Like in previous papers, the estimated elasticities allow us to 
measure economies of scale and density, but in this case using more recent data.  
Figure 4 depicts the elasticity of total cost with respect to peak load, delivered 
electricity and network length estimated for each observation, sorted in increased order 
at the observation-level. Peak load seems to be the most important cost driver with an 
average elasticity equal to 0.48. This figure also allows us to examine the reliability of 
our estimated elasticities when we move away from the sample mean. Although the first 
derivative of our cost function just provides a first-order approximation to the 
underlying elasticity at the sample mean, most observation-specific elasticities are in a 
reasonable order of magnitude, except for the negative values on the left in two of the 
curves. In these cases, our estimates should be viewed with caution as they correspond 
to some observations which are far away from the sample mean.20 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Adding the first-order coefficients of the two outputs we find that the elasticity 
of density evaluated at the sample mean is quite similar in all models, varying from 0.49 
to 0.54. These values suggest the existence of important economies of density in the 
electricity transmission industry. That is, given network infrastructure, electricity 
transmission networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics. Greenfield and Kwoka 
(2011) find increasing returns to scale with values between 0.39 and 0.53 for US RTOs 
that arises from two types of variation: geographic expansion and demand increase over 
a fixed network. 
To analyze economies of scale, which involves expansions in both output and 
network, we need to add the cost elasticity of the network length to the elasticity of 
density. The elasticity of scale evaluated at the sample mean in Model 5 is 0.69. Figure 
5 shows the estimated economies of scale and density for all the observations, each 
series sorted by increasing order. Most firms in our sample exhibit increasing returns to 
scale, except teen that indicate decreasing returns to scale with a value of the elasticity 
higher than one. These results suggest that electricity transmission networks still exhibit 
                                                 
20 For most functional forms (e.g., the Translog function) there is a fundamental trade-off between 
flexibility and theoretical consistency. For instance, maintaining global monotonicity (e.g. positive 
elasticities and marginal costs) is impossible without losing second order flexibility. For example, Barnett 
et al. (1996) show that the monotonicity requirement is by no means automatically satisfied for most 
functional forms, and that violations are frequent. 
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natural monopoly characteristics when network is expanded to meet the extra demand. 
Using data for 1990, Pollitt (1995) finds, however, different degrees of economies of 
scale depending on firms’ size for the US transmission utilities. In particular, he finds 
that decreasing returns to scale are more common in small utilities while increasing 
returns to scale are more common in medium and large companies. This seems to be 
consistent with the results obtained here, as in our sample we only have large firms. 
Dismukes et al. (1998) also show that all the NERC reliability regions in U.S. exhibit 
significant economies of scale for the transmission companies, while Huettner and 
Landon (1978) find that of six expenses categories, only sales expenses exhibits 
increasing returns to scale over the whole of the observed output range. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
6. Conclusions 
The electricity industry in most developed countries has been restructured in 
recent decades with the aim of reducing costs, improving service quality and 
encouraging electricity utilities to perform efficiently. The remaining regulated 
segments (i.e. transmission and distribution) provide the infrastructure for the 
competitive segments and represent an important amount of the total price paid by final 
customers. Despite the fact that electricity transmission is the baseline for distribution 
and commercialization, there is a lack of empirical studies that analyze both economic 
characteristics of the technology and firms’ inefficiency in electricity transmission.  
To fill this gap in the literature we have analyzed firms’ performance in the US 
electricity transmission industry for the period 2001-2009. The analysis of the economic 
characteristics of the technology and inefficiency of US utilities relies on the estimation 
of several stochastic cost frontiers. Our stochastic frontier models allow us to identify 
determinants of firms’ inefficiency in this industry. In particular, we have included a 
wide range of variables as determinants of firms’ inefficiency such as weather variables, 
a measure of companies’ cost structure and growth rates of energy demand. Unlike 
previous papers, we control for weather conditions, one of the most decisive 
uncontrollable factors in electricity transportation, by including a set of weather 
variables that were gathered specifically for the present application.  
We have found that there has not been an improvement in average efficiency in 
the US electricity transmission industry over the period 2001-2009. Moreover, 
regardless of the estimated model, our results indicate that efficiency has declined (and 
diverged) over time, suggesting that regulatory benchmarking techniques can identify 
room for improvement in performance of the US electricity transmission system. 
 The estimated coefficients provide useful information about firm’s performance 
with both policy and managerial implications. We have found using more recent data 
than in previous papers that, given network infrastructure, electricity transmission 
networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics. This result explains why electricity 
transmission is still regulated. 
In efficiency analysis and incentive regulation of utilities it is important to 
control for the effect of differences in environmental factors on the performance of 
regulated firms. This is particularly important in the case of incentive regulation and 
benchmarking of electricity networks where the results of efficiency analysis have 
important financial implications for the firms. In this sense, our results clearly indicate 
that more adverse conditions generate both higher levels of inefficiency and higher costs 
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for firms operating in areas with unfavourable weather conditions. Regulators should 
then take into account this cost disadvantage in setting efficiency targets within 
incentive regulation. We also find that investing in capital is a better strategy to deal 
with adverse weather conditions rather than incurring in additional operating costs. This 
might suggest a regulatory framework that favours capital investments to deal with 
unfavourable weather conditions. 
Finally we have found that, as expected, firms' performance gets better when 
demand tends to be steady as firms cannot adjust their inputs without cost over time. 
This result, combined with the previous finding on the importance of capital 
expenditure to deal with weather conditions, suggests that regulators should also take 
into account that achieving long-term efficiency improvements can involve short-term 
increases in both capital and operational costs and, hence, a deterioration in firms’ 
short-term relative performance. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 Variable Units Mean Max. Min. Std.Dev. 
Totex Cost US$ 144,602,000 667,127,000 20,713,600 120,324,000 
Peak Load Output MW 6,173 23,111 380 5,533 
Electricity Delivered Output MWh 6,280,310 74,584,700 56,730 8,839,980 
Network Length Network Miles 4,064 16,292 1,087 3,253 
Capital Additions Investment US$ 57,051,200 911,518,000 508,295 87,748,400 
Annual Salary Input Price US$ 62,075 94,005 34,024 10,523 
Producer Price Index Input Price Index 179.05 222.40 155.00 21.35 
Minimum Temperature Weather °F -10.35 19.90 -59.80 16.51 
Wind Speed Weather Knots 6.84 9.60 4.63 1.01 
Precipitation Weather Inches 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.03 
Capex/Opex Other Ratio 1.18 5.90 0.13 0.70 
Growth in Demand Other % 0.03 244.11 -74.96 17.72 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the Translog cost function. 
 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
(ALS) (M1+Trend) (M2+Weather) (M3+W*COR) (M4+Growth) 
Variable Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
Constant 12.972 523.54 12.983 372.56 13.038 309.34 13.055 336.83 13.057 333.11 
ln PLit 0.435 18.27 0.446 13.95 0.481 15.61 0.478 16.90 0.484 17.50 
ln DEit 0.056 5.03 0.054 3.20 0.057 3.32 0.057 3.52 0.050 2.90 
ln NLit 0.190 7.41 0.187 5.34 0.161 4.90 0.167 5.18 0.159 4.77 
ln (LPRit/KPRit) 0.472 5.22 0.464 3.72 0.533 3.93 0.607 4.37 0.592 4.27 
½ (ln PLit)2 -0.084 -1.96 -0.071 -1.08 0.005 0.08 0.028 0.48 0.020 0.32 
½ (ln DEit)2 0.038 3.12 0.036 2.11 0.027 1.72 0.029 1.86 0.023 1.43 
½ (ln NLit)2 0.189 2.55 0.183 1.82 0.223 2.52 0.243 2.87 0.226 2.69 
½ (ln (LPRit/KPRit))2 0.562 1.27 0.445 0.66 0.017 0.02 -0.085 -0.12 -0.074 -0.11 
ln PLit · ln DEit 0.029 1.64 0.026 0.92 0.012 0.45 0.014 0.56 0.021 0.79 
ln PLit · ln NLit 0.171 3.94 0.162 2.70 0.126 2.48 0.115 2.33 0.132 2.43 
ln PLit · ln (LPRit/KPRit) 0.650 3.95 0.573 2.47 0.491 2.16 0.425 1.99 0.436 2.03 
ln DEit · ln NLit -0.088 -4.23 -0.088 -2.90 -0.072 -2.53 -0.072 -2.68 -0.079 -2.90 
ln DEit · ln (LPRit/KPRit) -0.131 -1.86 -0.137 -1.61 -0.091 -1.11 -0.070 -0.87 -0.086 -1.07 
ln NLit · ln (LPRit/KPRit) -0.663 -3.63 -0.593 -2.36 -0.569 -2.25 -0.580 -2.42 -0.560 -2.31 
t -0.011 -1.77 -0.022 -2.43 -0.031 -3.10 -0.030 -3.05 -0.030 -3.15 
t2 -0.003 -1.40 -0.002 -0.96 -0.002 -0.76 -0.002 -0.79 -0.002 -0.67 
t · ln PLit 0.058 6.64 0.052 4.81 0.041 4.21 0.039 4.15 0.038 4.08 
t · ln DEit -0.020 -4.07 -0.019 -3.41 -0.011 -1.97 -0.009 -1.78 -0.009 -1.67 
t · ln NLit -0.059 -5.10 -0.054 -4.01 -0.042 -3.36 -0.041 -3.43 -0.040 -3.39 
ln INVit 0.061 3.80 0.058 3.16 0.078 4.33 0.075 4.37 0.078 4.36 
Variance of u 
Constant -2.075 -14.90 -2.919 -8.42 -3.480 -9.48 -3.661 -9.08 
t 0.112 2.47 0.274 3.35 0.350 4.06 0.359 4.11 
TMINit -0.039 -3.01 -0.034 -2.09 -0.039 -2.27 
WINDit 0.761 3.34 0.895 3.20 0.863 3.04 
PRCPit 21.323 3.08 21.181 2.57 22.873 2.73 
TMINit · CORi 0.088 2.60 0.080 2.32 
WINDit · CORi -0.817 -1.80 -0.939 -1.91 
PRCPit · CORi -15.942 -1.06 -11.762 -0.78 
POSGRi 0.046 2.25 
NEGRi -0.042 -1.06 
Sigma 0.387 0.380 0.363 0.383 0.384 
Lambda (λ) 3.035 2.792 1.910 1.949 1.994 
Log LF 1.14 4.11 19.68 30.11 34.45 
Chi-squared LR test 66.636 60.681 29.558 8.689 - 
(9) (8) (5) (2) - 
Note: The unrestricted model in all model selection LR tests is M5.  Degrees of freedom in parenthesis 
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Figure 1. 
Annual evolution of outputs divided by Totex 
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Figure 2. 
Histogram of efficiency scores for the firms using the heteroscedastic model 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Firm's efficiency
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Annual evolution of the efficiency for the electric transmission sector 
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Figure 4. 
Elasticities of cost for outputs and network 
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Figure 5. 
Elasticities of scale and density 
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APPENDIX 
 
Data appendix A: Variables and definitions from FERC FORM No. 1 
 
Variable   Definition FERC pages FERC account names/notes 
 AK Allocation key (wages) SWTR / (SWTT - SWAG)  
 SWTR  354-21b Salaries and wages (transmission) 
 SWTT  354-28b Salaries and wages (total) 
  SWAG   354-27b Salaries and wages (admin. and general) 
OPEX   Operational expenditure 100 * (TTE + AK * (TAGE - EPB - RCE - GAE)) / CPI   
 TTE  321-112b Total transmission (op. and main.) expenses 
 TAGE  323-197b Total administrative and general expenses 
 EPB  323-187b Employee pensions and benefits 
 RCE  323-189b Regulatory commission expenses 
  GAE   323-191b General advertising expenses 
CAPEX   Capital expenditure 100 * (DEP + IR * KBAL) / CPI   
 DEP Depreciation DETP + AK * (DEPGP + DEPCP)  
 DEPTP 336-7b Depreciation (transmission plant) 
 DEPGP 336-10b Depreciation (general plant) 
 DEPCP 336-11b Depreciaton (common plant) 
 KBAL Capital balance OCK - ADEP  
 OCK Original cost of capital BTP + AK * BGP  
 BTP  207-58g Balance end of year (total transmission plant) 
 BGP  207-99g Balance end of year (total general plant) 
 ADEP Accumulated depreciation ADTTP + ADTRP + AK * ADTGP  
 ADTTP 219-25c Accumulated depreciation total (transmission plant) 
 ADTRP 219-27c Accumulated depreciation total (regional plant) 
  ADTGP 219-28c Accumulated depreciation total (general plant) 
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TOTEX   Totex OPEX + CAPEX   
PL   Peak Load 401b (d) Peak load (MW) 
DE   Electricity Delivered 401a-17 (b) MWh (total) 
NL   Network Length 422 (f) + (g) Length of transmission lines (miles) 
COR   Capex / Opex CAPEX / OPEX (average over time for each firm)   
GROWTH   Growth in Demand [(TE current year - TE previous year ) / TE previous year] * 100   
 
 
Data appendix B: Variables from other sources. 
 
Variable   Definition Source 
LPR  Annual Salary Data Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
      (from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
KPR   Producer Price Index US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
TMIN   Minimum Temperature National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) 
WIND   Average Wind Speed National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) 
PRCP   Average Precipitation National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) 
CPI   Consumer Price Index International Labour Organisation - LABORSTA 
IR   Interest rate (6%) Nillesen and Pollitt (2010), p.66 
 
